Soft power
Geographic isolation has traditionally limited Australians' appreciation of the role of power in international affairs. As a country which has moved from close alignments with first Britain and then the USA as the major maritime powers, Australia has been on the winning side in terms of the global power balance. At a regional level, similarly, Australians have paid little thought to their own power relative to others: until the end of the twentieth century, for instance, the Australian economy was larger than all of South-East Asia combined, with a military superiority to match. And within its limited sphere of influence in the South-West Pacific, Australia has always been the largest power by a considerable margin.
This situation, however, is starting to change. In terms of the core dimensions of power, Australia's military alliance with the USA remains key to its security, but the USA is less dominant today than at any time since the end of World War II. Similarly, Australia's own relative weight in sheer demographic terms is also diminishing in comparison to the rising economies of Asia, being dwarfed not only by China, Japan and India, but also by rising powers such as Korea, Thailand and, increasingly, Indonesia. At the same time, the weight of Africa and Latin America is growing in world affairs. Partly this is a result of political developments: almost all the major states of sub-Saharan Africa and South America are today electoral democracies, a far cry from the dominance of one-party autocracies or military juntas of earlier decades (Figure 2 ). Partly it is a result of demographics: after Asia, these are the world's most populous continents, with some of the youngest and fastest-growing populations. And partly it is a result of economics and the growth trajectories of what are relatively young economies. The combination of political stability, a large and youthful population, and fast-growing economies is key to the emergence of countries like Brazil and Indonesia as major powersto-be of the twenty-first century.
Discussions of soft power typically contrast it with classic 'hard' power resources such as economic and military force. For Australia, these have long been focused north:
. In most economic areas, Australia's ties to the northern hemisphere are dominant. Of its top-10 trade partners, only one country (New Zealand) is in its own hemisphere. China, Japan and other North-East Asian countries are at the top of the list. Australia as a southern hemisphere 'soft power' 255
. Similarly, Australia's hard security relationships are dominated by the US alliance and the US-led military coalitions with which it has regularly participated in Asia and the Middle East. . Culturally, Australia is a European-origin country with a significant attachment to US cultural exports and an increasingly diverse immigrant base which also comes overwhelmingly from the northern hemisphere.
But what of Australian 'soft power'? As defined by Joseph Nye (1990, 154) , soft power, in contrast to the classic 'hard' resource of military might, 'is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion' and relies on 'the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies'. As Nye noted in his original formulation of the concept, a country's soft power includes not just culture and diplomacy, but also factors of technology, education, aid and trade-all of which are becoming more significant in international power. It is these kinds of soft power resources that are key to Australia's role in the southern hemisphere. In 2004, in a stimulating series of public lectures, Paul Kelly (2004, 42 ) bemoaned Australia's lack of understanding of soft power, calling it 'a powerful idea [which] is undervalued as a tool for Australian policy', and arguing that 'Australia's singular recent failure lies in its inability to conceptualize its soft power as a national strategic asset'. This may be starting to change. Recent years have seen a marked shift in emphasis towards Australian soft power in science, education and sport in its own hemisphere. One example is Australia's distribution of international development assistance. Most of Australian aid, as has long been the historical pattern, goes to its near neighbours in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. But recent years have seen this complemented by the growth of new aid initiatives in Africa and Latin America. In combination with the upscaling of aid under the Rudd-Gillard Labor government, and the renewed focus by the Abbott government on Indonesia and Papua New Guinea as the two largest recipients of Australian aid, this has resulted in a much greater concentration than previously on the global 'south', geographically defined, which in 2012-13 received 60 percent of all Australian aid. Another aspect is the changing composition of Australian society (Figure 3 ). According to figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, over one-quarter of all migrants to Australia over the past 20 years have hailed from the southern hemisphere (predominantly Oceania, but also with strong representation from southern Africa). While the Closer Economic Relations treaty, which guarantees freedom of movement between Australia and New Zealand, is the major part of this story, also important is the long wave of post-apartheid immigration from South Africa, which is now the fifth-largest source of permanent migrants in Australia (behind New Zealand, the UK, China and India). By contrast, permanent migration from the Americas has been negligible.
When it comes to the other big component of long-term arrivals in Australiaeducation-the picture is reversed. There, amongst the southern hemisphere regions it is Latin America which is today a booming market for Australian higher education: 'Latin American student enrolments have grown fourfold since 2004, with annual growth of more than 34 per cent, making Latin America one of the fastest growing sources of foreign students for Australia' (Smith 2010) . With African enrolments also growing fast, stimulated by the growth in AustraliaAfrica scholarship awards, the higher education export market is, in many ways, the sine qua non of Australian soft power (Bryrne and Hall 2011) .
A final, more symbolic, example of the increasing people-to-people links between Australia and the other southern hemisphere countries is in the area of professional sport. As Nye noted in his original conceptualisation of soft power, new forms of communications and transportation have a revolutionary effect on economic interdependence. In terms of southern hemisphere regionalism, nowhere is this intertwining more apparent than in the rugby alliance between South Africa, New Zealand and Australia (SANZAR), which, along with Argentina, form the basis of professional competition at the international (Rugby Championship) and provincial (Super Rugby) levels. These major sporting competitions are, by some margin, the most geographically dispersed in the world today.
Trade and investment
Trade and investment is another area of international affairs where Australia's role as a southern hemisphere power is increasingly apparent. In particular, the trade groupings Australia has led, such as the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries, tend to be overwhelmingly southern-hemisphere-focused.
Half of all Cairns Group members are Latin American countries, which tend to share Australia's objective of global agricultural trade liberalisation. This gives the Cairns Group a strategic role as a rare body in which southern hemisphere views dominate ( Figure 4 ). Expansion of the Cairns Group to include South Africa was praised by the Minister for Trade Tim Fischer (1998) as reinforcing the group's 'Southern Hemisphere axis'. APEC, too, while based around Asia, also includes Mexico, Chile and Peru amongst its membership, as does the putative Trans-Pacific Partnership (currently Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Chile, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the USA). The massive investment boom in mining and other resource projects currently occurring in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America has likewise led to a massive increase in engagement by Australian companies and multinationals across the Australia's two-way trade with both Africa and Latin America is currently some AU$6 billion dollars in each case-a small total, but growing fast (12 percent per annum in relation to Latin America)-but with a substantially higher investment level, much of which is commercially valuable and thus not widely publicised. Australian business interest in Africa in particular has gone from negligible a generation ago to over 40 percent of international Australian mining projects today being in Africa. According to government estimates, the AU$24 billion of current Australian mining investment in Africa is likely to double as new projects come on stream.
A broader issue here is simply one of scale and size: while Asia is the world's most populous continent, Africa is the second largest with more than a billion people, and Latin America third with over 600 million. Both are growing rapidly in economic terms and both can be expected to be much more assertive in international affairs in coming decades. Indeed, the most rapidly growing countries in the past decade have not been in Asia but Africa, which is home to 6 of the world's 10 fastest-growing economies.
Regional interventions
Another example of Australian soft power can be seen in its peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions in the South-West Pacific. Australia has a long record of joining conflicts with its northern allies as a belligerent, and also of participating in peacekeeping and other forms of cooperative interventions. A hemispherical focus helps clarify the demarcation between these very different kinds of missions. While Australia's role as a subordinate partner in 'hot' military coalitions of the willing has predominantly been in the Middle East (Iraq, Afghanistan) and, before that, East Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaya, Korea), its role in peacekeeping over recent decades has been quite different.
All the Australian 'cooperative intervention' style of peace enforcement operations have occurred in its own immediate neighbourhood-via the International Force for East Timor, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and peace-monitoring missions in Papua New Guinea's Bougainville province, as well as in Tonga following the burning of Nuku'alofa (with New Zealand playing a leading role). With the partial exception of East Timor, all these interventions have been non-coercive multifaceted exercises in peacebuilding, underpinned by the soft power of development assistance and people-to-people links rather than conventional military power. Moreover, in many of these missions, much of the on-the-ground work was done via policing rather than outright military means. The Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group is one of the few deployable civilian police capabilities worldwide, and the police's personnel have played a significant stabilisation and capacity-building role in all the missions above, as well as in the short-lived Enhanced Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea.
Australian-led multinational operations in the South Pacific are good examples of this distinctive velvet-glove application of Australian power within its own region. RAMSI initially comprised over 2000 military, police and civilians from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga, with Australia and New Zealand providing the bulk of the personnel and logistical support. Headed by a civilian special coordinator, RAMSI's main task was to restore law and order, and to help stabilise Solomon Islands' finances, both of which were achieved in relatively short order. The longer-term challenge continues to be in the areas of law and justice, the machinery of government and economic viability. The mission has reinforced the importance of deployed civilian police in state-building operations. This was also evident in the 1998-2003 Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, which replaced the New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group. Importantly, both these 'cooperative interventions' remained broadly popular with the bulk of their islands' populations, which is vital to any successful application of soft power (Wainwright 2010) .
In sum, in contrast to Australia's active combat role in a succession of conflicts in Asia and the Middle East, Australia's interventions in its own hemisphere have been distinctive for their lack of an overt military character. This soft-power approach to hemispheric issues even extends to Australia's power projection into the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. As an Australian Strategic Policy Institute paper has noted: 'Most strategic thinking in Australia is locked into hard power, but the oceans offer us great potential to apply soft power and creative diplomacy' (Bateman and Bergin 2009, 4) . Nowhere is this more true than in the Australian Antarctic Territories, its claim to some 42 percent of the Antarctic landmass. While this claim is contested or unrecognised by other major powers, it is the case that Australia's activities within this zone are entirely focused on scientific research that, unlike some other claimants, have no military component (Fogerty 2011).
Geographic reality makes Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica perennial, unlike those of some other claimants. The future of Australia's Antarctic role will depend in large part on the extent to which it is prepared to build on its scientific investment there (Bergin and Press 2011) . In the same vein, the increasing importance of Africa and Latin America to Australia only really becomes clear when we turn away from the economic statistics and look at the areas of scientific research, education and sport, and other informal areas of cooperation. It is in these areas, discussed below, that the development of southern hemisphere regionalism has been most active.
Science and security
Scientific research is one field in which pan-hemispheric collaboration has long been important. In some fields, it is essential. Perhaps the most prominent example is in the field of astronomy, where study of the universe depends on a network of trans-hemisphere telescopic facilities aimed at the southern sky, such as the cross-country research project involving the SkyMapper telescope (based in Siding Springs, New South Wales) and the Giant Magellan Telescope (to be constructed in Chile). The most recent example of this southern hemispheric astronomical collaboration is Australia and South Africa's shared hosting of the world's largest telescope: the Square Kilometre Array. After an intense six-year battle between the two bidding nations, a split-site solution for the giant radio telescope will create over a square kilometre of collecting area, with more than 3000 antennas to be built in both countries.
Like the southern skies, the southern waters engage the interests of every regional state. Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are thus a shared concern of all the major littoral states of the southern hemisphere. This has stimulated various attempts at Southern Oceanic Rim cooperation over the years in areas such as the demilitarisation of Antarctica and the protection of the Southern Ocean (and also significant disunion over these same issues). New Zealand, in particular, has urged the so-called Antarctic 'gateway states' of Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand to collaborate more closely over the protection of living resources such as toothfish in the Southern Ocean and the environmental protection of the Antarctic.
One attempt to institutionalise these shared interests was the Valdivia Group, established with some fanfare in 1995 to take these common interests to a more formal level. Named after the southern Chilean city where they first met, the Valdivia Group's membership brought together all the key southern hemisphere states-Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa-based on their common scientific interests in environmental issues such as ozone protection and protection of biodiversity. While the group has struggled to meet tangible goals, the identification of the Southern Oceanic Rim as a shared interest of all member countries was an important step in geopolitical terms (Dodds 1998) . Alexander Downer made this argument explicitly in 1996 when he said:
As countries of the Southern hemisphere, we should devote greater attention to collaborative structures with each other. The purpose of the Valdivia Group is to ensure that our ties with the northern hemisphere do not cause us to overlook our links to the east and west; links which stretch across the South Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans ... we Southern hemispheric countries share a very strong mutual interest in ensuring the success of international efforts to understand and preserve this vital part of our environment (quoted in Dodds 1998, 734) .
While probably ahead of its time, the Valdivia Group remains an indicator of the kinds of coalitions that may be needed in the future as changing environmental circumstances force countries to re-imagine their geopolitical relationships (Bamsey 2003) . One example of this re-imagining was the call in 2012 for Australia to establish a federated space agency with countries in the southern hemisphere to maximise the commercial return from its space research and technology (Australian National University 2012).
There is also an increasing security dimension to Australia's satellite facilities. The USA is currently building a radar station and a surveillance telescope near Exmouth in Western Australia, which, according to Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop (2014) , 'will make use of Australia's unique geography to increase the southern hemisphere coverage of the US's Space Surveillance Network'. At the moment, the USA can track movements of Chinese, North Korean and other space assets in the northern hemisphere but not in the southern area, prompting Bradley Perrett of Aviation Week & Space Technology to claim that: 'The radar and telescope on Australian soil would be active and perhaps crucial in any confrontation between the US and China' (Hartcher 2014) .
Similarly, the European Space Agency relies on another West Australian tracking station, in combination with a sister facility in Argentina. The crucial point here is simply one of geographic comparative advantage: in areas of scientific research, ranging from astronomy and meteorology to oceanography and climate science, Australia's southern hemisphere location gives it a global role far larger than its raw population and economic size would suggest (Matthews 2008) .
Conclusion: the geopolitics of Australia's soft power
Thinking about Australia as a southern hemisphere power helps distinguish Australia's enduring interests from its passing preoccupations. For instance, at the time of writing, Australia is supporting major international commitments in both Afghanistan and Antarctica, with the former receiving far more attention than the latter. Yet Australia's national interest in Afghanistan is, at the end of the day, likely to be utterly transitory, while its interests in the Antarctic are permanent, the dictate of geography, and a shared environmental and spatial realm.
Thinking about shared space in this way is useful, as it helps knit together a series of regions that are often treated as separate-Antarctica, Oceania, Latin America and southern Africa-but actually have common and unchanging spatial contexts, and thus many common and unchanging interests. This is not a new insight. In the nineteenth century, Australia's role as a southern hemisphere power was eagerly embraced by its politicians. Australia, it was claimed, would become a kind of America of the southern hemisphere-'Mistress of the South Seas', as Sir Henry Parkes told the federal parliament in 1890.
In the same vein, Australia's historical connections with both southern Africa and Latin America are also more complex than many contemporary writers assume (Evans and Grant 1995) . These have comprised a wide range of contacts, from military involvement to migration, to diplomatic, cultural and economic interaction-from Australia's eager participation in the Boer War in South Africa to the failed attempt to found a utopian socialist settlement in Paraguay, Colonia Nueva Australia (Whitehead 1997; Wilcox 2002) . The imperial approach was particularly prevalent in the South Pacific, including Queensland's annexation of Papua and the subsequent capture of German New Guinea and Samoa. The preamble to the initial draft of the Australian constitution included provision not just for New Zealand, but also Fiji to join the Commonwealth. As Meany has shown, Australia's own version of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to the South Pacific is another part of this story (Meaney 1976) .
Over the course of the twentieth century, the focus of Australia's foreign affairs shifted, as two world wars, Korea, Vietnam and a long cold war all focused its attention north, in the context of its military alliances first with Britain and then the USA. More recently, the emergence of Asia as Australia's (and the world's) economic epicentre has only deepened this trend. Today, Australia's economic sights are set firmly north, as are its hard security interests and most of its diplomatic attention. The southern hemisphere is not, and probably never will be, the main game for Australia. But it deserves to be seen as part of the game, especially when so many key elements of Australia's soft power-development assistance, international peacekeeping, trade groupings and some of its most important scientific, educational and sporting initiativesare now converging hemispherically.
One telling indication of this is the way in which Australia is conceived and perceived by others. In contrast to much of the world, in which Australia is frequently overlooked or ignored, three key southern hemisphere states-New Zealand, South Africa and Argentina-routinely compare themselves and their experience to Australia. In New Zealand, such comparisons (both positive and negative) are widely practised and appear to be embedded in popular consciousness. In South Africa, they have traditionally been the preserve of the white English-speaking population and their relatives who have emigrated to Australia, but also arise in the area of public policy, where Australian experience is frequently cited. In Argentina, the comparisons are more historical, usually bewailing the very different economic and political trajectories of what were the world's two richest countries on a per capita basis a century ago. The experience of all of these 'settler societies' influenced the work of historians such as Donald Denoon (1983) , who noted that the history and geography of settler colonialism in the 'temperate' southern hemisphere followed strikingly similar patterns.
The tension between historical and contemporary interpretations suggests that the time is right for a re-evaluation of Australia as a southern hemisphere power. In sum, we need to start thinking of the southern hemisphere less as a peripheral region of marginal importance and more as our forebears did-as a key arena for Australia's engagement with the world in general and for Australian soft power in particular.
